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Abstract 
 
The geographical allocation of Spanish aid has been little studied, despite the fact that it is 
unusually concentrated on middle-income countries. This paper sets out a model of Spanish 
ODA policy based on a mixture of recipient needs, donor interests and effectiveness 
considerations. Moreover it analyses both the aid-partner selection process and the eventual 
aid-quota allocation. The results show that Spain has followed an eclectic pattern of aid 
allocation, involving recipient needs, but where self-interest predominates and performance 
criteria are absent. The apparently insufficient progressiveness of the Spanish allocation is 
due mainly to the influence of the post-colonial links –although these links have 
characterized the geographical specialization of all donor countries that were once colonial 
metropolises. 
 
Key words. Official development assistance (ODA), aid allocation, geographical 
specialization, aid effectiveness, recipients’ needs, donor’s interests 
 
Resumen 
La asignación geográfica de la ayuda española ha sido poco estudiada, a pesar de su inusual 
concentración en los países de ingreso medio. Este artículo propone un modelo explicativo 
del patrón de asignación de la AOD española que combina variables relativas a las 
necesidades de los países socios, variables de interés de política exterior española y 
condicionantes de eficacia. Asimismo, se analiza tanto el proceso de selección de países 
socios, como la decisión final de asignación de cuotas de ayuda. Los resultados muestran que 
España ha seguido un patrón ecléctico de asignación, en el que se combinan factores de 
necesidad relativa de los países socios e intereses de política exterior, pero preponderándose 
estos últimos y desconsiderándose, en ocasiones, otros criterios de eficacia. La 
aparentemente insuficiente progresividad de la ayuda española se debe principalmente a la 
influencia de los vínculos post-coloniales –vínculos que han caracterizado los patrones de 
especialización geográfica del resto de países donantes que fueron metrópoli coloniales. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The analysis of the geographical aid allocation 
patterns of the different donor countries 
started in the late 1960s with the aspiration to 
improve the management of the –per se 
scarce– resources committed to furthering the 
progress of the developing world. To date, the 
Spanish aid giving pattern has been little 
studied, in spite of its unusual concentration 
on middle-income countries, a fact which 
brings about an apparent “regressive bias” of 
aid allocation and blurs Spain’s commitment 
with the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDG) and its special attention to the poorest 
countries. However, more than 41% of the 
world’s poor population lives in middle-
income countries on less than 2 dollars a day, 
a fact that contrasts with the decreasing 
emphasis that these countries are receiving 
from the international aid community. In this 
context, some kind of specialization is needed 
within the international co-operation system, 
in order to support the development processes 
of those countries that are closer to the 
“border” of the developed world and thus 
boosting the creation of a framework of 
incentives which encourages national efforts. 
Therefore, Spain’s aid specialization in middle-
income countries may be advisable, provided 
that it responds to a balanced pro-
developmental strategy and not primarily to 
other –self– foreign policy interests. 
 
This paper analyses the Spanish official 
development assistance (ODA) pattern of 
geographical specialization within an 
“integrated” recipients’ needs and donor’s 
interests approach (RN–DI). After this first 
introductory section, the second summarizes 
the studies applied to the Spanish case. Section 
3 develops a geographical allocation 
framework for Spain’s aid, simplifying the 
complex Spanish policy in a three-step 
decision process. The fourth section sets out 
the econometric procedures used for the 
estimation of an accurate RN–DI model of 
Spanish assistance. Section 5 offers the 
empirical results, analysing, on the one hand, 
the aid selection stage and, on the other, the 
aid-quotas stage, distinguishing between two 
groups of partner countries in terms of their 
post-colonial links. Finally, section 6 points 
out the main conclusions of the analysis and 
proposes policy criteria that seek to improve 
the impact of the geographical allocation of 
Spanish aid. 
2. STUDIES OF THE 
GEGRAPHICAL ALLOCATION OF 
SPANISH AID 
 
Although a number of studies have analysed 
the geographical aid allocation patterns of the 
main bilateral and multilateral donors, the 
Spanish case has received very limited attention1. 
Only two pieces of research have particularly 
studied this donor’s pattern of aid giving: 
 
Alonso (1999) carried out a cross-section 
analysis of the Spanish 1996 ODA allocation, 
verifying that, although the aid distribution 
was guided by both “aid demand and supply 
factors”, the foreign policy’s regional 
preferences determined, to a great extent, the 
allocation pattern. However, once this regional 
factor was considered, the aid disbursements 
were directly related to the recipients’ 
developmental needs. As a conclusion –the 
author claimed– “it is necessary to correct the 
historical regional preferences of the Spanish 
co-operation system if we want to put an end 
to the bias that, to-date, can be found in its 
geographical distribution and grant a clearer 
priority to the less developed countries” (pp. 
135-136). 
 
Sánchez Alcázar (1999) studied the Spanish 
aid disbursed to Latin America between 1989 
and 1993, ascertaining that the donor’s self-
interests (exports, especially) determined the 
aid allocation, whereas the recipients’ needs 
did not affect the distribution. These results 
partially disagree with those offered by Alonso 
(1999), although these two studies refer to 
different periods, and therefore the 
discrepancies can be explained by changes in 
the allocation pattern over time. In any event, 
the trade bias pointed out by Sánchez Alcázar 
belongs to the “gestation period” of the 
Spanish co-operation system, when aid loans 
contributed to 60% of the gross bilateral ODA 
disbursements (in contrast with the 32.2% 
share in 1998–99 and the 19% in 2004–05). 
Other studies have compared the allocation 
patterns of different donors, using “standard” 
models of analysis –i.e. applying the same 
genral model to different bilateral and 
multilateral donors–, although few of them 
have specifically looked into the case of Spain: 
                                                 
1 McGillivray and White (1993), Tarp et al. (1998), McGillivray 
(2003a), Jones et al. (2005) and Tezanos (2008) review the 
economic contributions to the studies of aid allocation. 
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Berthèlemy and Tichit (2002) carried out a 
panel-data analysis of the aggregated ODA 
allocation of the 22 DAC donors for the period 
1980–99, using the same set of explanatory 
variables for each donor country (and, 
therefore, “assuming that all the donors have 
the same behaviour”, p. 9), but included 
dummy variables in order to reflect their 
peculiar interests, such as the colonial links. In 
accordance with their Tobit estimates, Spain 
was strongly specialized in its former colonies 
–as has occurred with other former 
metropolises–, giving them, on average, during 
the 1990s decade, between 2.3 and 2.7 
additional dollars of per capita aid. 
Alesina and Weder (2002) analyzed the aid 
allocation of 13 DAC donors using a Tobit 
panel data model for the period 1970–94. In 
the case of Spain (with the analysis restricted 
to the period 1990–94), none of the 
considered explanatory variables (per capita 
income, population, trade openness and 
political rights) were found statistically 
significant in the aid per capita allocation. 
However, as they used the same “standard” 
model for analysing different donors’ 
allocations, they did not consider the colonial 
past as an explanatory variable in the Spanish 
specialization, which may bias the estimates 
due to the omission of a relevant regressor2. In 
any case, this failure to identify a systematic 
pattern of aid allocation responds –to a great 
extent– to the high resources’ fragmentation 
among those countries that do not share post-
colonial links with Spain. 
Isopi and Mavrotas (2006) analysed the ODA 
per capita allocation of 20 DAC donors during 
the period 1980–2003 using a Tobit panel data 
model. Regarding the Spanish case, they 
conclude that –for the period 1991–2003– “the 
elements that influence Spain’s aid allocation 
are a mixture of the donor self-interests and 
recipient needs” (p. 14). This analysis includes 
different model specifications and uses several 
sets of explanatory variables. In accordance 
with their full-model, Spanish aid allocation 
has been positively related to the share of 
“social aid” (the percentage of bilateral ODA 
devoted to the sector of “social infrastructure 
                                                 
2 Alesina and Weder measured the historical links by means of the 
number of years that the developing countries were colonies of the 
metropolises during the 20th Century, thus excluding all Spanish 
colonies. They also used a variable of political alliances (the 
frequency of cases in which the receiving country voted in the UN 
in the same way as the donor) that could not be used in the case of 
Spain due to the lack of information. 
and services”), although Isopi and Mavrotas 
emphasize that “the trade relations seem to 
play a leading role in foreign aid allocation” 
(p. 14), which –in their opinion– is due to the 
strong trade links maintained with the former 
colonies. The allocation also favours the 
countries with more egalitarian income 
distributions and higher growth rates in the 
previous year. They also included two 
additional regressors in the model: the aid 
“past outcomes” (i.e. aid effectiveness3) and 
the infant mortality rate, which were shown to 
be significant and positively related with the 
per capita aid distribution. Finally, arms 
transfers, per capita income, population and 
the quality of democratic institutions were 
found irrelevant in the allocation, thus 
concluding that “political and strategic factors 
do not exert a relevant impact in the allocation 
process” (p. 15). However, Isopi and Mavrotas 
do not include any cultural affinity variable, 
although they mention the post-colonial links 
in order to explain most of their results. 
Moreover, they introduce assumptions that are 
not appropriate for the particular Spanish co-
operation policies (among others, the 
assumption that the effectiveness of the World 
Bank’s projects is equivalent to that of Spain’s 
projects is far from clear, given the strong 
discrepancies that can be found in the 
geographical interests of both donors). 
All in all, the Spanish pattern of aid giving 
shows some similarities with those of the USA, 
Japan and France –which are also strongly 
determined by their preferences towards their 
respective geographical interests– and differs 
greatly from the aid allocation of the 
Scandinavian countries, UK, the Netherlands 
and Canada –which are, to a larger extent, 
oriented towards the most needed developing 
countries. 
 
3. THE ALLOCATION 
FRAMEWORK OF SPANISH ODA 
 
This section proposes a geographical allocation 
framework for the Spanish ODA which follows 
the seminal contribution of Dudley and 
Montmarquette (1976) by focusing the 
analysis on the economic behaviour of the 
 
                                                 
3 Isopi and Mavrotas used the World Bank’s Operations and 
Evaluations Department calculations of the aid projects’ rates of 
return, assuming that the levels of effectiveness obtained by the 
analyzed bilateral donors are identical to those of the World Bank 
(inter alia effectiveness). 
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decision-makers responsible for the aid 
allocation4. However, contrary to other 
theoretical contributions, the model proposed 
in this paper puts forward a specific 
framework for a Spanish co-operation policy, 
understanding that more general approaches 
do not consider the peculiarities of the policy 
management of the donor States, thus offering 
less precise interpretations of their 
specialization patterns5. The model conceives 
the Spanish ODA geographical allocation as a 
three-step decision process, taking into 
account the censored nature of the dependent 
variable –an approach that has not been 
previously applied to the study of the Spanish 
case6–: in the first stage, the Spanish 
Government decides both the total amount of 
resources that will be devoted to international 
co-operation, and the share of multilateral and 
bilateral aid; in the second stage, the 
Government chooses the group of partner 
countries which will receive bilateral aid from 
the list of “eligible” developing countries 
according to the OECD DAC’s directives; 
finally, in the third stage, the aid-quotas of 
each partner country in the Spanish budget are 
determined. 
 
 
3.1. First decision stage: 
determination of the Spanish ODA 
budget and the shares of 
multilateral and bilateral aid 
   
Given the particularities of the Spanish aid 
management policy, it is assumed that the 
first-step decision is exogenous to the 
geographical allocation of aid: the Spanish 
Government decides annually both the total 
ODA budget, and the share that will be 
actually managed by the Spain’s public sector 
(bilateral aid) and that by international 
organizations (multilateral aid), independently 
                                                 
4 Other theoretical models that followed Dudley and 
Montmarquette are: Trumbull and Wall (1994), Tarp et al. 
(1999), Feeny and McGillivray (2002) and Feeny (2003). Based 
on this model, several empirical applications have been carried 
out, using increasingly sophisticated econometric techniques, 
from the initial regression analyses with cross-section data (see, 
for example, Levitt, 1968; Mckinlay and Little, 1977; Maizels 
and Nissanke, 1984; and Alonso, 1999), to the most complex 
panel data models with limited dependent variables (such as 
Tarp et al., 1999; Berthèlemy and Tichit, 2002; Alesina and 
Weder, 2002; Neumayer, 2003; and Isopi and Mavrotas, 2006). 
5 Only Tarp et al. (1999) developed a theoretical model adapted 
to the singular characteristics of the analysed donor: the Danish 
State. 
6 Neither Alonso (1999), nor Sánchez Alcázar (1999), 
considered in their studies the censored nature of aid. 
of the eventual geographical distribution of 
resources among developing countries. 
The Government decides on the annual aid 
budget within the Spain’s General Public 
Budget (Presupuestos Generales del Estado), 
within the “foreign policy” item7. The Public 
Budget specifies the endowment of the several 
Central Government aid agents that carry out 
bilateral policies (therefore not including local 
and regional governments’ aid budgets) and 
the contributions to international 
organizations (multilateral aid). The Budget is 
finally approved by the Parliament and, thus, 
the Government decides the geographical 
allocation of aid as far as it determines the 
endowment of the main aid instruments 
managed by the different aid decision-makers. 
 
Moreover, the Government is also responsible 
for elaborating the Spanish Aid Strategic Plan 
(Plan Director de Cooperación), which 
specifies the strategy for the next 4 years, 
including the geographical priorities. Finally, 
the Spanish Aid Department (SECI) elaborates 
the Annual Plan of International Co-operation 
(PACI), which details the aid budget and the 
endowments of the different official aid policy 
agents (including, in this case, the local and 
regional governments), with the purpose of 
advancing towards fulfilling the goals set forth 
in the four-year Aid Plan. 
 
All in all, the central Government is the first 
“aid policy-maker”, deciding both the volume 
of resources, and its preliminary geographical 
distribution. Nevertheless, eventually different 
economic agents take charge of the aid 
administration: these are mainly the Spanish 
Aid Agency (AECI, attached to the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and Co-operation), several 
Ministries, local and regional governments, 
NGOs and the international organizations 
financed by Spain. 
 
The proposed model considers that the result 
of this first-step decision is determined ex 
ante. The Government decides every year the 
amount of ODA in accordance with its own 
preferences for different public policies that 
compete for the resources endowment8.  
                                                 
7 However, there are also extra-budgetary items, such as debt 
forgiveness, which is internationally coordinated. 
8 It should be recalled that the Spanish ODA/GNI ratio has been 
increasing in the last two decades, from 0.08% in 1986-87 to 
0.27% in 2005. Moreover, there is a recent political commitment 
that determines the aid budget: achieving the 0.5% ODA/GNI 
ratio by 2008 (as foreseen by the Aid Plan) and the 0.7% by 
2012. 
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Finally, the ODA budget ( tA
~
) is specified each 
year in the PACI, delimiting the maximum 
amount of resources finally distributed among 
international organizations or directly 
managed by the different public agents of the 
Spanish State. This trade-off can be written as 
follows: 
 
∑∑ +≤ M
m
mt
J
j
jt AAtA
~
    
     
 [1] 
 
where ∑J
j
jtA  is the total bilateral ODA 
allocable among J possible developing 
countries and ∑M
m
mtA  is the multilateral ODA 
available for financing M different 
international organizations9. 
 
In particular, during the period 2000–05, 
Spain distributed, on average, almost 40% of 
its resources via multilateral organizations 
(well above the average of most donor 
countries), despite the fact that the Spanish 
geographical priorities have not always 
matched the multilateral interests10. This 
discrepancies were remarkable during the 
period 2000–05: the main recipient regions of 
aggregated multilateral ODA were Africa 
(especially the Sub-Saharan region) and Asia 
(especially South and Central Asia), which 
shared 43% and 34% of the total net 
disbursements, respectively; on the other 
hand, Spanish bilateral ODA went mainly to 
Latin America (totalling 45%, almost 6 times 
more than multilateral aid), followed, at great 
distance, by Africa (21%, i.e. less than half of 
the multilateral allocation), being specially 
lower the participation of the Sub-Saharan 
region (15.5%). 
 
Moreover, it should be born in mind that, to a 
large extent, financial contributions to 
international organizations are compulsory for 
their members, and have previously 
determined quotas and time schedules 
                                                 
9 There are also aid resources committed to finance horizontal 
co-operation strategies that cannot be geographically allocated 
to specific recipient countries. 
10 See Tezanos (2007, pp 8-10) for further explanations on the 
Spanish multilateral-bilateral trade-off, and the different patterns 
of geographical aid allocation between multilateral and Spanish 
ODA. 
(usually, biannual), that cannot be easily 
affected by individual bilateral donors11. All in 
all, it is assumed that the decision on how 
much aid to allocate to multilateral 
organizations (as a share of the Spanish total 
aid budget) is “predetermined”, and, therefore, 
its effect on Spain’s geographical allocation is 
exogenous, given the limited influence that 
bilateral donors exert on the orientation of 
multilateral aid12. Thus, the first summing-up 
expression of equation [1] yields the 
geographically allocable bilateral ODA –
exogenous and politically predetermined– that 
constitutes the dependent variable of this 
analysis. 
 
3.2. Second decision stage: 
selection of aid-partner countries 
 
Secondly, the model assumes that the Spanish 
State selects the group of aid-partner countries 
each year. The selection stage can be analysed 
according to the following attraction index13: 
 
γϕδβα
jtjtjtjtjt HGINe j ⋅⋅⋅⋅=Λ  
0 ≤ αj ≤ 1; 0 ≤ β ≤ 1; 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1;
 0 ≤ ϕ ≤ 1; 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1  
 [2] 
 
where Λjtjt measures the interest of the donor 
for a developing country j. N, I, G and H are 
vectors of explanatory variables regarding the 
recipient countries’ needs, the donor’s 
interests, the aid effectiveness determining 
factors and the allocation’s path dependence 
(history), respectively. β, δ, φ, and θ are sets of 
weights; all of them are constrained within the 
interval [0, 1] so as to reflect the possible 
existence of decreasing marginal returns14. The 
parameter αj measures the fixed effects 
associated with each recipient country that are 
not determined by the variables N, I, G and H. 
                                                 
11 However, donor countries can make voluntary subscriptions 
to multilateral institutions. They can also voluntarily contribute 
to funds and programmes, which are recorded by the DAC as 
“multi-bilateral aid” –therefore, as the recipient countries are 
identifiable, these resources are included in the present analysis. 
12 Nevertheless, it is possible that Spain conceives the pattern of 
multilateral ODA allocation as complementary to its own 
geographical preferences. This way, the large share of Spanish 
assistance received by Latin America would compensate for the 
lower attention received by this region on the part of the 
multilateral co-operation. 
13 The use of a “selection threshold” follows the approach of 
Tarp et al. (1999). 
14 The existence of decreasing marginal returns guarantees that 
the donor will not concentrate all its resources in one recipient: 
the one with the highest score in the attraction index. 
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Once the donor estimates the attraction 
indexes for each partner country, the following 
selection rule is applied: 
 
Djt = 1  if 
ϑ
tBjt
Ak ⋅≥Λ  
Djt = 0  if 
ϑ
tBjt
Ak ⋅<Λ  
 
Pr(Djt = 1) = Pr(
ϑ
tBjt
Ak ⋅≥Λ ) = 
Pr( 0≥⋅−Λ ϑ
tBjt
Ak ); –∞ < ϑ  < ∞  
 [3] 
 
where Djt = 1 indicates that country j is chosen 
as a partner, ABt is the predetermined amount 
of bilateral ODA geographically allocable 
among J possible developing countries, and k 
is a constant. Recipient countries are ranked 
following their respective scores on the 
attraction indexes, which determine their 
selection probabilities, so that those above the 
selection threshold k⋅ ABtϑ  are finally chosen as 
aid-partners. 
 
The parameter ϑ reflects the donor’s 
aversion/predisposition to disperse its aid 
budget among the J eligible countries: if ϑ > 0, 
there is aversion to dispersion (as ϑ tends to 
∞, the dispersion of the resources is penalized 
and the selection probability decreases); on the 
other hand, if ϑ < 0, there is predisposition to 
dispersion (as ϑ tends to –∞, both the 
dispersion of the resources and the probability 
of being chosen as an aid-partner increases). 
Also, if ϑ = 0, the selection rule does not 
depend on the volume of aid. This parameter 
of aversion to dispersion is especially 
outstanding in the context of a donor, as 
Spain, that is experiencing a gradual increase 
of its resources: as the volume of ODA 
increases, so does the financial capacity to 
disburse aid to a greater number of countries 
and –therefore– the probability of being 
selected as a partner. Nevertheless, if ϑ > 0, the 
donor's aversion to dispersion will compensate 
the previous effect. 
 
The result of choosing the country j as a 
partner is thus interpreted as the difference in 
the utility obtained by Spain between giving 
and not giving aid to this country, being 
positive in the event of selection and zero or 
negative otherwise. 
 
Substituting [2] into [3] and using logarithms 
yields the following linear probability 
function: 
 
Pr(Djt = 1) =  ( )0lnlnlnlnlnlnPr ≥−−++++ Btjtjtjtjtj AkHGIN ϑθϕδβα
   
j = 1, 2, ..., J 
t = 1, …, T      
     
 [4] 
 
The following relations in the process of 
selecting aid-partners are expected: 
 
0
)1Pr( >∂
=∂
jt
jt
N
D
; 0
)1Pr( >∂
=∂
jt
jt
G
D
;
 0
)1Pr( >∂
=∂
jt
jt
I
D
;
 0
)1Pr( >∂
=∂
jt
jt
H
D
 [5] 
 
i.e. the probability of being selected as a 
partner for Spanish assistance depends on, 
simultaneous and positively, the developing 
country’s relative level of aid need, the interest 
it has for Spanish foreign policy and the 
factors determining aid effectiveness. 
Moreover, the allocation’s path dependence 
directly affects probability of being “re-
selected”. 
 
3.3. Third decision stage: 
allocation of aid-quotas 
 
Once a subset of K-partner countries has been 
selected (being K≤ J), the Spanish State passes 
to the aid-quotas stage, in which it decides the 
specific quotas of each country in the ODA 
budget: 
 
1≤=
Bt
jt
jt A
A
a      
     
 [6] 
 
where ajt measures the share of country j in 
Spain’s aid and ABt is the total amount of 
bilateral ODA geographically allocable among 
K-recipient economies: ABt =∑
=
K
j
jtA
1
. 
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The Spanish objective function for 
geographical aid allocation is then defined as 
follows: 
Φa = f(a, N, I, G, H)    
     
 [7] 
 
where the variables are interpreted as in 
previous equations. Specifically, the objective 
function can be written as: 
 
Φa = ( )∑
=
⋅⋅⋅⋅
K
j
jtjtjtjtjt HGINa j
1
θϕδβα  
0 ≤ αj ≤ 1;    0 ≤ β ≤ 1;    0 ≤ δ ≤ 1;    0 ≤ ϕ ≤ 1;    
0 ≤ θ  ≤ 1                          
 [8] 
 
where the parameters αj, β, δ, φ and θ are 
constrained within the interval [0, 1] so as to 
indicate the possible existence of decreasing 
marginal returns. 
 
The aim of the Spanish co-operation policy is 
to maximize the total utility derived from the 
aid allocations to K-partner countries, subject 
to the budget constraint (assuming that the aid 
budget is totally disbursed): 
 
s.t. ∑
=
K
j
jta
1
= 1    
                [9] 
 
This restriction implies that a marginal 
increase in the aid-quota assigned to a specific 
partner country will decreases the share of, at 
least, another country. 
   
The lagrangian resulting of maximizing [8] 
subject to [9] is: 
 
Max 
( ) ⎟⎟⎠⎞⎜⎜⎝⎛ −+⋅⋅⋅⋅= ∑∑ ==
K
j
jt
K
j
jtjtjtjtjta
aHGINaL j
jt 11
1λθϕδβα
               [10] 
 
The first order conditions are: 
 
λα θϕδβα −⋅⋅⋅⋅⋅=∂
∂ −
jtjtjtjtjtj
jt
HGINa
a
L j 1 , 
 and    
 [11] 
∑
=
−=∂
∂ K
j
jta
L
1
1λ     
                
 [12] 
 
Working out the value of ajt we get the shares 
received by each developing country from the 
Spanish ODA: 
 
jj jtjtjtjtj
jtjtjtjtj
jt
HGIN
HGIN
a
αθϕδβα
θϕδβ λ
α
α
λ −−
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ ⋅⋅⋅⋅=⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
⋅⋅⋅⋅=
1
1
1
1
 
   [13] 
 
Taking logarithms in equation [13] yields the 
linear function: 
 
jtjtjtjtjjt HGINa lnlnlnlnln
***** θϕδβα ++++=
      
j = 1, 2, ..., K 
t = 1, …, T      
      [14] 
 
where: 
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j
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⎛
=
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* ;    
jα
ββ −= 1
* ;    
jα
δδ −= 1
* ;   
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ϕϕ −= 1
* ;    
jα
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The expected relations in the allocation of the 
aid-quotas are15: 
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∂
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jt
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a
;
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∂
jt
jt
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a
    
 [15] 
 
Therefore, equations [4] and [14] specified a 
RN–DI hybrid model, and its specification 
allows us to consider a different set of 
explanatory variables in each decision-step16. 
                                                 
15 We could also define cross-elasticities so as to reflect the fact 
that the allocation to a particular partner country does not 
depend only on its RN–DI scores, but also on the scores of the 
K–1 remaining recipients. For reasons of simplicity, the model 
only considers the direct elasticities indicated in equation [17]. 
16 i.e. there is not an a priori reason for the parameters of these 
two equations to be the same. 
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Finally, Tarp et al. (1999) pointed out that 
there is a potential econometric risk of 
simultaneity in the determination of the total 
aid budget ( tA
~
, see equation [1]) and the 
share of aid finally allocated to each partner 
(a,jt, see equation [13]). This problem would 
be serious if, either the total aid budget or the 
distribution among bilateral and multilateral 
aid, were to depend also on the same RN–DI 
function. 
 
3.4. Determinant factors for 
Spanish aid allocation 
 
As equations [2] and [7] establish, Spain’s aid 
allocation decision depends on several 
variables that, for reasons of simplicity, may be 
grouped into four explanatory factors: 
recipient countries’ needs, donor’s foreign 
policy interests, aid effectiveness determining 
factors and the allocation’s path dependence: 
 
i) Regarding the recipient countries’ 
relative needs, aid should be concentrated in 
the poorest countries, as it is explicitly pointed 
out by the OECD, which attributes to the ODA 
“the promotion of the economic development 
and welfare of developing countries as its main 
objective” (OECD: DAC, 2007, 
http://www.oecd.org/dac). In the particular 
case of Spain, the Aid Law establishes that the 
main objective of aid is to contribute to the 
“eradication of the World poverty, in all its 
manifestations” (1st article), and understands 
that the human being is the main protagonist 
of the co-operation policies. Especially clear is 
the aspiration to allocate the resources in 
accordance with the basic criterion established 
in the article 5: “[...] less economically and 
socially developed countries will receive 
special attention from the Spanish co-
operation”. 
 
Moreover, Spain should take into account the 
relative level of need of each partner country 
in terms of their share in the global ODA (i.e. 
the total aid disbursed by multilateral and 
bilateral donors). On this matter, there are two 
possible scenarios: 
 
– A negative relation between the 
Spanish allocation and the rest of the 
donors’ allocations shall reflect certain 
coordination among donors’ 
interventions, avoiding infra and supra-
allocations in specific regions. In this 
scenario, it is reasonable to consider that 
the Spanish middle-income country 
orientation is due to a specialization 
pattern with Latin America, agreed 
within an international coordination 
scheme. 
– On the contrary, a positive relation 
shall reflect the existence of the so-called 
“bandwagon effect”. As Dudley and 
Montmarquette (1976) first explained, 
this behaviour implies that the donor’s 
perception of the impact of its aid on a 
specific developing country is positively 
influenced by the volume of aid that this 
country attracts from the rest of donors. 
 
ii) With regard to foreign policy interests, 
traditionally Spain has oriented its aid towards 
Latin America, Equatorial Guinea, the 
Philippines and Morocco, due to the historical 
links. The Spanish Aid Law clearly establishes 
that the geographical priorities are “[...] Latin 
American countries, the Arab countries of 
North Africa and Middle East, as well as other 
less developed countries that maintain special 
historical and cultural links with Spain” (6th 
article). These historical links are determined 
by a series of cultural affinities, such as 
language, religion and legislative tradition; 
factors that Spain has considered facilitate 
more effective co-operation relations. 
Supporting this argument, the DAC’s review 
on Spanish aid (2002) pointed out the 
existence of a “comparative advantage” with 
Latin America, based on strong linguistic, 
cultural and historical ties. 
 
Furthermore, Spain may be stimulating its 
trade and investment interests through the 
allocation of aid to its main economic partners. 
In fact, this was the original aim of the 
Development Assistance Found (the so-called 
FAD loans), which was set up in 1976 in order 
to foster the exports of the Spanish enterprises. 
 
iii) Regarding the determinant factors of aid 
effectiveness, the international community has 
increasingly reached a consensus on the 
significance of the recipient countries’ 
economic, social, political and institutional 
environment in the development process and 
the effectiveness of aid17. Good governance has 
been one of the main DAC’s concerns since 
1989, which points out the existence of a “vital 
connection between open, democratic and 
                                                 
17 Good reviews on aid effectiveness literature can be found in 
Alonso (2003) and McGillivray (2003b). 
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accountable political systems, individual rights 
and the effective and equitable operation of 
economic systems”18. Thus, Spanish aid should 
promote good public policies, as is expressly 
ratified both in the Aid Law and the current 
Aid Plan: the latter claims that one of the aid’s 
main goals is “[…] the promotion of 
democracy and the respect of the fundamental 
rights, from a real and effective citizen 
participation, and the exercise and respect of 
human rights, as they are recognized within 
the United Nations framework” (MAE, 2005, 
p. 37). Moreover, the Plan claims that the 
geographical specialization should be guided 
by the “greater commitment of recipient 
countries to the development goals, and, in 
particular, the adoption of appropriate policies 
to fulfil the goals of the Millennium 
Declaration and other international 
agreements signed by the country” (p. 99). 
 
In the end, it is assumed that aid is more 
effective in those countries with sound 
political and institutional environments. This 
assumption is the heir of the pioneer studies 
on aid effectiveness carried out by Burnside 
and Dollar (1997 and 2004) –promoted by the 
World Bank’s Development Research Group– 
which claimed that the impact of aid on 
growth depends both on the recipient 
countries’ policies and institutions, and on the 
management by the donor. Although these 
results have been highly controversial, Collier 
and Dollar (2001 and 2002) developed the so-
called “anti-poverty efficient allocations”, 
which were published in the World Bank’s 
report Assessing Aid (World Bank, 1998), 
arguing that a re-allocation towards poor 
countries with sound policies could free from 
poverty a greater number of people than the 
current resource allocation. 
 
Furthermore, the recipient economy’s 
absorptive capacity is included in the model so 
as to take into account the productive 
constraints of additional aid allocations and 
the existence of decreasing marginal returns 
on aid19. 
 
                                                 
18 Policy statement by DAC aid ministers and heads of aid 
agencies on development co-operation in the 1990s, reprinted in 
the 1989 DAC Development Co-operation Report, OECD 
(1989). Available in: 
http://www.oecd.org/LongAbstract/0,2546,en_2649_34435_275
5285_119814_1_1_1,00.html 
19 See, among others, the studies of Dudley and Montmarquette 
(1976), Lensink and White (2001) and Hansen and Tarp 
(2000). 
iii) With regard to the aid’s path 
dependence, the proposed model measures the 
“inertial effect” exerted by previous 
allocations, which has several explanations: 
 
a) Donors tend to co-operate with 
a steady group of partner countries so as 
to minimize the aid administrative costs; 
i.e. adding new partners means incurring 
in additional expenses due to the 
necessity of implementing new bilateral 
mechanisms in order to assure that aid is 
effective. Moreover, the donor’s aid 
management may be benefited by 
“learning economies”, based on previous 
experiences of assisting the same group 
of countries, which lead to increased 
administrative efficiency levels. Spain’s 
current effort of acquiring greater 
administrative capacity in the so-called 
“priority countries” determines, to some 
extent, these countries future 
probabilities of being aid recipients –
and, in the end, their permanence in the 
list of priorities20. 
b) Closely related to the previous 
argument, the donor is responsible for 
providing their partners with a stable 
assistance so as to generate long-term 
sustainable development processes –
provided that the terms of co-operation 
are fulfilled–. This is the case of Spanish 
aid which is reinforced by the current 
increasing emphasis on programme aid, 
instead of short-term projects. A greater 
stability in the relations with partner 
countries is also caused by the use of 
new aid instruments (such as global 
funds, budget support and sector wide 
approaches), which have longer term 
perspectives. 
c) The inertia is led by previous 
experiences where aid was shown to be 
particularly effective. Thus it may 
include the factor of “previous results” 
identified by Isopi and Mavrotas (2006), 
but without the controversial 
assumption of inter alia effectiveness21. 
d) Spain’s co-operation with Latin 
America has been especially stable over 
time. The Aid Plan gives a set of 
institutional and geo-strategic reasons, 
which constitute an inertial movement 
                                                 
20 Most of these countries already have in situ technical co-
operation offices and country strategic plans. 
21 In this respect, the current Aid Plan is committed to make 
progress in aid planning and management procedures, based on 
previous results, in order to increase the effectiveness levels. 
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in the assistance and why “Latin America 
has been, and will be, a priority region 
for Spanish aid” (MAE, 2005, p. 104). 
Moreover, Spanish NGOs’ assistance to 
Latin America also has a structural 
character, and the inertia of this co- 
operation is partially due to the reduced 
size of these organizations (which 
determines their specialization in this 
region) and the cultural and linguistic 
affinities with the Latino countries. 
e) Long-running political 
commitments between donor and 
recipient have an outstanding 
importance in the allocation process and 
contribute to an additional factor of 
stability, as it is specially complicated to 
retract resources from a long-running 
aid-partner.  
 
4. EMPIRICAL MODEL OF 
SPANISH ODA GEOGRAPHICAL 
ALLOCATION 
 
4.1. Econometric specification of 
the model 
 
The estimation of the allocation framework 
explained in the preceding section requires 
tackling the censored nature of ODA 
allocations –i.e. the exclusion of some 
developing countries from the Spanish 
assistance implies that aid is partially 
continuous with positive probability mass at 
the value of zero–. Thus aid flows are 
represented by the selection of a threshold –
which is a latent variable– where the donor 
starts to disburse positive amounts of aid (see 
the attraction index defined in equation [3]). 
If the observations for ajt = 0 were excluded 
from the sample, the estimates will be biased 
and inconsistent, as would be the case of an 
ordinary least square estimation. By contrast, 
limited dependent variable regression models 
do not omit these null observations, allowing 
the “latent” decision of excluding those 
countries that lie under the threshold level to 
be analysed.22. For this reason, the present 
                                                 
22 Three alternative econometric models have been previously 
used in the aid allocation analysis: the TOBIT model; the type 2 
TOBIT model (HECKMAN or sample selection model); and the 
two-part model. Neumayer (2003) offers a good review of the 
econometrics of these models within the context of the aid 
allocation analysis. 
analysis uses a two-part model for the 
estimation23.  
 
The aid selection stage defined in equation [4] 
is therefore estimated by means of the 
following regression function with a binary 
dependent variable and a panel data set24: 
 
Pr(Djt = 1) = 
jtjtjtjtjtj uHGIN +++++ lnlnlnln θϕδβα
    [16] 
where αj, β, δ, φ and θ are the parameters to 
estimate 
 
The aid share stage defined in equation [14] is 
estimated separately for the group of partner 
countries that has post-colonial links with 
Spain and those countries without these 
historical ties. This procedure avoids the 
constraint of the fixed-effect model regarding 
the estimation of explanatory variables which 
do not vary over time. The panel data 
regression function used in both cases is 
written as25: 
 
jtjtjtjtjtjt uHGINDa jjt ++++++== lnlnlnln)1( ''''''* θϕδβαα
 
   [17] 
 
ajt = ajt* → if  Djt = 1 
ajt = 0  → 0 otherwise 
where the variables are defined as in previous 
equations and ai,j
* represents the potential aid 
endowments. 
 
4.2.   Measurement of the 
dependent variable: Spanish 
bilateral ODA 
 
This paper analyses the bilateral resources 
classified by the DAC as official development 
assistance (ODA). As Spain does not report on 
commitments, the study uses aid 
disbursements. However, while aid 
                                                 
23 See Tezanos (2007, pp- 17-18) for further explanations on the 
selection of the econometric model. 
24 Specifically, equation [16] is estimated by means of a logit 
regression model. As there is not an easy routine implemented 
in STATA 9.2 for logit (unconditional) fixed-effect estimation, it 
uses a random-effects model. 
25 In accordance with the results of the Hausman specification 
tests, the allocation equation for the ex-colonial countries is 
estimated by means of a fixed-effects panel data model and the 
equation for countries without historical links uses a random-
effects model (results available upon request). 
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commitments and gross disbursements are 
strictly positive, net disbursements can be 
negative due to the paying-off of previous 
“concessional loans” computed as ODA. 
Spain’s gross disbursements have been 
historically much greater than its net 
disbursements, and the proportional difference 
between both amounts has been well above the 
average of the UE and DAC donors. Given the 
historical importance of the FAD loans within 
the Spanish assistance, gross disbursements 
may be a biased measure of the real transfer of 
resources to developing countries. 
Nevertheless, the FAD loans are managed by 
the Ministry of Industry, Tourism and Trade 
with a high degree of independence with 
respect to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The 
latter does not directly consider in its 
geographical orientations the loans pay-off 
schedule so as to compensate the negative 
disbursements26. Thus, in order to analyse the 
most realistic image of the aid transfers and the 
Spanish aid management policy, the proposed 
model uses ODA gross disbursements as the 
dependent variable of the model. 
 
Emergency aid is subtracted from the ODA 
gross disbursements because it is assumed to 
be disbursed to countries under emergency 
situations in an “additive” way –i.e. additional 
to the resources that were already allocated to 
them–, being its geographical distribution 
independent of the previously resolved one. 
 
With regard to the debt relief actions, these are 
multilateral programs in which the Spanish 
State is taking part (mainly, the HIPC 
Initiative and the negotiations of the Paris 
Club), that impose a specific calendar and map 
of execution, where individual donors cannot 
exert a direct influence on the geographical 
orientations. However, debt forgiveness cannot 
be considered as strictly exogenous from each 
bilateral donor’s process of allocating aid, as 
donors could bring forward the amount of 
resources previously assigned to the countries 
favoured by debt cancellations. In fact, 
multilateral debt programmes specify detailed 
time schedules for the relief flows, which are 
often negotiated in international forums before 
bilateral donors decide the geographical 
allocation of their own resources. Despite this 
fact, the Spanish geographical allocation has 
                                                 
26 This fact explains the incoherencies between the Spanish 
geographical priorities defined in the Aid Plan and the aid 
eventually disbursed: e.g. there is a number of “preferential 
countries” that have received negative net disbursements, such 
as Mexico in the last 7 years. 
occasionally been affected by major debt 
actions27, partially because debt relief 
programmes are managed by the Ministry of 
the Exchequer irrespectively of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and Co-operation. This highly 
independent management implies a lack of 
coordination between both Ministries, which 
consequently impedes anticipating the 
eventual aid allocation to those countries 
benefited by debt relief. Thus, the present 
analysis detracts debt actions from the ODA 
gross disbursement and considers that the 
resulting amount is a better approximation of 
the resources finally allocated by the aid 
decision-makers. 
 
Once the Spanish ODA gross disbursements 
are obtained –netted of emergency aid and 
debt cancellations–, the dependent variable of 
the aid-partners selection stage is computed by 
means of a dummy variable that classifies 
developing countries into two possible 
categories: “D = 1: selected partner country” 
and “D = 0: otherwise”. The classification rule 
is the existence of a “significant” disbursement 
of aid. As McGillivray and Oczkowski (1992) 
pointed out, it is convenient to use a 
“minimum threshold” of aid receptions so as 
to compensate the limited impact of highly 
scattered aid allocations that renders a certain 
number of recipients with particularly low 
shares –as is generally the case among the 
largest donors, although it is also typical of 
Spain–. While choosing a specific threshold 
level can be, ultimately, an arbitrary 
procedure, it is especially convenient in the 
case of the Spanish ODA, given the high level 
of geographical dispersion. Therefore, the first-
step estimation defines a partner country only 
if it receives, at least, a 1% share of Spain’s 
ODA. Otherwise, the logit regression would be 
seriously unbalanced, with a greater share of 
category 1 (i.e. the number of selected 
countries are greatly superior to the number of 
non-selected ones), over-estimating the 
probabilities of being selected28. 
 
The dependent variable of the aid share stage 
is measured as each partner country’s quota in 
the predetermined annual amount of Spanish 
aid. This definition in percentage terms has 
                                                 
27 Especially outstanding were the debt relief of Guatemala, in 
2001, and Iraq, Madagascar and the Republic of Congo, in 2005, 
which turned these countries into the main recipients of Spanish 
ODA. 
28 Different threshold values change the probability of being 
selected as an aid-partner. However, they do not considerably 
affect the magnitudes and signs of the estimated parameters. 
Therefore, the model remains consistent. 
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two relevant virtues. On one hand, it 
eliminates the bias introduced by the 
comparison of figures coming from different 
years, being possible to use gross 
disbursements data in current dollars; and it 
also eliminates the measurement error due to 
the fluctuations of the euro/dollar exchange 
rate. On the other hand, it avoids the bias due 
to the fact that the Spanish aid budget is 
increasing over time. Ultimately, since the aid 
figures reported by the DAC are measured in 
current dollars, we assume for simplicity that 
the euro/dollar real exchange rate remains 
constant among the recipient countries, not 
considering the discrepancies in the aid “real 
purchasing power”. 
 
4.3. Measurement of the 
explanatory variables  
 
The selection of the corresponding proxy 
variables for the determinant factors of the 
Spanish aid allocation explained in section 3.4 
follows three different criteria: firstly, it 
includes those variables that best capture the 
peculiarities and interests of the Spanish ODA 
policy. Secondly, it is guided by the literature 
review of precedent studies on geographical 
aid allocation. Finally, –from a more practical 
perspective– it tries to both maximize the data 
available for developing countries (avoiding in 
this way a sample selection bias due to a non-
random omission of data), and to avoid 
informative redundancy (that may cause 
multicolinearity problems). The variables 
included in the analysis are listed in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Variables and sources of the RN–DI model 
Variable Code Estimation stage 
Kind of 
variable 
Number 
of lags Main source 
Dummy: Spanish  aid-
partner D SE 
dependent 
variable  … OECD: DAC (2007) 
Share on Spanish  ODA 
gross disbursements A QE 
dependent 
variable … OECD: DAC (2007) 
GDP per capita (USA 
constant dollars 2000, PPP) GDPpc SE, QE RN 2 WORLD BANK  (2006) 
Population POP SE, QE RN 2 WORLD BANK  (2006) 
Death rate DR SE, QE RN 2 WORLD BANK  (2006) 
Share on global ODA 
(excluding Spanish aid) a_others SE, QE RN … OECD: DAC (2007) 
Colonial dummy  d_COL SE, QE DI … CIA (2007) 
Share on Spanish exports EXP SE, QE DI 1 UN ComTrade DataBase (2007) 
Cumulative net stock of 
Spanish foreign investment FDI SE, QE DI 1 
Ministerio de Industria, 
Turismo y Comercio 
(2007) 
POLITY2 P2 SE, QE AE 1 MARSHALL and JAGGERS (2005) 
Absorptive capacity 
(ODA/GDP) AC SE, QE AE 2 WORLD BANK  (2006) 
Share on Spanish  ODAt-1 
gross disbursements a _t_1 SE H 1 OECD: DAC (2007) 
Notes: SE: selection stage; QE: aid-quotas stage; RN: recipients’ needs; DI: donor’s interests; AE: aid 
effectiveness determinants; H: aid’s path dependence 
 
 
4.3.1– Recipients’ needs 
 
The present model proxies the recipient 
countries’ relative needs of aid by means of the 
following variables: 
 
The per capita GDP (USA constant dollars 
2000, PPP) is used as an indicator of the 
average economic welfare of the recipient 
societies. It tests the existence of a 
“progressive distributional criterion” in 
relation to the partner countries’ income 
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levels, assessing the coefficient of the income’s 
natural logarithm29. 
 
Recipient countries’ population sizes are 
included so as to test the sensitivity towards 
the most populated countries. Given the 
special interest of Spain in its former colonies 
(the majority of which were, except Mexico 
and Philippines, countries of less than 45 
million inhabitants in 2005), it tests the 
existence of a small countries bias (i.e. 
whether the population coefficient is smaller 
than 1). 
 
As per capita income levels only offer average 
information on economic wellbeing, other 
aspects of social wellbeing are approximated 
by means of the death rate. This variable is 
both less correlated with per capita income 
than other synthetic indicators (such as the 
Physical Quality of Life Index and the Human 
Development Index), therefore reducing the 
risk of multicolinearity, and is widely available 
among developing countries, thus reducing 
the risk of a no-random sample selection 
bias30. 
 
The share of each recipient country on the 
global ODA (i.e. total aid disbursed by 
multilateral and bilateral donors), excluding 
Spanish aid, is included in the analysis so as to 
test the existence of a “bandwagon effect” in 
the allocation. 
 
4.3.2– Donor’s interests 
 
Spain’s economic and geo-strategic interests 
are proxied by means of the following 
variables: 
 
The importance of the special historical and 
cultural links is tested by means of a 
qualitative, dummy, variable, with two 
categories: “d_col = 1, if the country was part 
of the Spanish colonial Empire” and “d_col = 
0, otherwise”. 
 
Trade interests are evaluated by means of the 
share of each developing country on Spanish 
exports; on the other hand, the investment 
interests are measured by the net stock of 
                                                 
29 As the model is specified in natural logarithms (both the 
dependent variable and the independent variables), it thus 
facilitates the interpretation of the coefficients in terms of 
elasticities. 
30 The use of the infant mortality rate raises serious concerns, as 
there are not available complete time series data, but five-year 
values. 
Spanish investment in each developing 
country, accumulated since 1990. It should be 
pointed out that, given that part of the ODA 
consists of “tied loans”, there is a potential risk 
of simultaneity between exports and aid 
disbursements. Nevertheless, exports are 
lagged one year, which reduces the risk of 
simultaneity, since tied aid stimulates, mainly, 
the current year exports. 
 
 
4.3.3– Determinant factors of aid 
effectiveness 
 
In order to approximate the partner countries’ 
commitment with democracy and the respect 
of  human rights, this paper uses the aggregate 
indicators of the Polity IV Project (Marshall 
and Jaggers, 2005), which offer comprehensive 
information on the characteristics of the 
different countries’ political regimes. In 
particular, it will use the POLITY2 synthetic 
indicator, which treats different aspects related 
to the institutionalization of democratic and 
autocratic regimes, codifying them within the 
interval between –10 (strong autocratic 
regime) and +10 (strong democratic regime). 
Thus, the coefficient of this variable is 
expected to be positive, reflecting Spanish 
support for more democratic countries. 
However, it should be pointed out that the 
level of democracy can also be interpreted as 
indicative of a country’s need for aid, thus 
expecting an indirect relation with the 
allocation. In fact, the Spanish Aid Plan 
defines the so-called group of countries “with 
special attention” as those suffering “special 
circumstances”, such as the necessity of 
preventing conflicts or contributing to 
building peace and the weak respect for 
human rights and the democratic system. 
 
Moreover, the recipient economy’s absorptive 
capacity is proxied by means of the ratio of the 
total ODA –bilateral and multilateral– received 
by the country to its GNI (ODA/GNI ratio), 
which is widely available among developing 
countries and offers a reasonable measure of 
the recipient economy’s aid-dependency 
level31. 
 
 
                                                 
31 High rates of ODA/GNI may stem from a “bandwagon effect” 
among donors’ allocations; however, this variable, in the case of 
Spanish aid, is not significantly correlated with the ODA 
received by the rest of the donors (r2 = –0.0304), ruling out the 
existence of a simultaneity problem. 
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4.3.4– Aid’s path dependence 
 
The previous year ODA-quota (Aj,t-1) is 
included in the aid-partners selection stage in 
order to capture the path dependence of the 
geographical allocations, assuming that 
previous disbursements positively influence 
the probability of being “re-selected” as a aid-
partner32. However, the lagged dependent 
variable is not included in the aid-quotas 
allocation stage since, within a panel data 
model, it introduces an important bias in the 
estimation due to the existence of 
autocorrelation. 
 
4.4. Model specification, sample 
and period of analysis 
 
As equations [4] and [14] specify, the model is 
transformed in a linear function by means of 
the natural logarithm, thus facilitating the 
interpretation of the coefficients in terms of 
elasticities and reducing the heteroskedasticity 
among observations33. 
 
In order to access the information available for 
the Spanish aid decision-makers in a realistic 
way, the explanatory variables are specified 
with different time lags. As was previously 
explained, the Spanish co-operation budgetary 
process begins with the approval, at the end of 
the preceding year, of the General Public 
Budget. Furthermore, the lengths of the lags 
are specified in accordance with the time-delay 
that takes place in the provision of 
international statistics34: in the case of per 
capita incomes, population levels, death rates 
and absorptive capacities, decision-makers 
faced a 2-year information lag (see Table 1). 
The share on Spanish exports, foreign 
investment and POLITY2 are lagged one year35. 
                                                 
32 In the Spanish context, there has been a high year-by-year 
variation of the aid-quotas, in contrast with the relative stability 
of the list of partner countries. In fact, the average coefficient of 
variation of these quotas between 1993 and 2005 was 0.655: i.e. 
on average, the inter-annual variation of a partner country’s 
quota was 65.5%. In this sense, the aid’s inertia has been 
especially important in the selection stage, but not as much in 
the aid-quota stage, which vary considerably year by year 
Author calculations with OECD: DAC (2007) data: developing 
countries’ quotas on Spanish ODA gross disbursements. 
33 The only exception is the POLITY2, which is expressed in its 
original rank units, since it does not accept reasonable 
interpretations in terms of elasticities. 
34 In fact, the Aid Plan explicitly points out that less developed 
countries will be identified by means of the socioeconomic 
indicators elaborated by international organizations. 
35 The share on global ODA is not lagged. The specification test 
pointed out that the Spanish aid allocation is specially related to 
the current year aid disbursements of the rest of the donors; 
This lag structure also reduces the potential 
simultaneity bias between the aid allocation 
and the explanatory variables. 
 
The analysis includes the 178 developing 
economies referred by the successive DAC lists 
of ODA recipient countries, published from 
1993 to 2005. 130 of these countries received 
Spanish ODA at least one year. 74 countries 
were eventually excluded from the analysis 
due to a lack of information; nevertheless, the 
missing countries respond to very different 
socio-demographic and economic profiles, a 
fact which limits the existence of a sample 
selection bias: they are countries in conflict or 
post-conflict situations (such as Iraq, 
Afghanistan and Somalia), territories whose 
independence have not been formally 
reconnoitred (Palestine and Western Sahara), 
countries which lack statistical information 
(Cuba, North Korea, East Timor, Liberia and 
Libya) and/or islands and regions with less 
than one million inhabitants (a great deal of 
them are least-developed countries: Wallis and 
Futuna, Turks and Caicos Islands, Tuvalu, 
Tokelau, Santa Helena, Niue, Nauru, 
Montserrat, Mayote, Cook Islands and 
Anguila), which have received very limited 
attention from Spanish co-operation. 
 
The period of analysis comprises from 1993 to 
2005 (the last year with available information). 
For those variables with one or two year lags, 
the information was analyzed starting from 
1992 or 1991, respectively. This period 
excludes the first “gestation” stage of the 
Spanish aid system (1986–92), so as to focus 
the study on the time when it was already 
consolidated. 
 
5. THE SPANISH PATTERN OF 
GEOGRAPHICAL AID 
ALLOCATION 
5.1. Selection of aid-partner 
countries 
 
During the period 1993–2005 Spain has 
selected its aid-partners mainly guided by 
factors of interest and inertia of its foreign 
policy (Table 2): in particular, it has been 
directly influenced by the post-colonial links, 
the reception of Spanish aid and exports in the 
                                                                         
moreover, the estimation results do not change upon the 
number of lags included in this variable. 
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previous year, and the resources received by 
the rest of the donors. Nevertheless, the 
selection process has neither systematically 
taken into account the recipients’ needs 
variables, nor their level of democracy 
 
 
Table 2. Estimation of the Spanish selection of aid-partner countries. 1993–2005 
Random-effects logistic regression              Number of obs      =      1279 
Group variable (i): n                           Number of groups   =       104 
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Obs per group: min =         4 
                                                               avg =      12.3 
                                                               max =        13 
                                                LR chi2(10)        =    245.43 
Log likelihood  = -255.15245                    Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
          D  |         OR   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   lnGDPpct-2 |   1.237373    .456867     0.58   0.564      .600091    2.551433 
     lnPOPt-2 |   .8354529   .1471694    -1.02   0.307     .5915321    1.179955 
      lnDRt-2 |   1.381162   .5396969     0.83   0.409     .6421441    2.970684 
   lna_others|   1.410425    .227055     2.14   0.033     1.028776    1.933657 
     lnEXPt-1 |   1.338513    .192901     2.02   0.043     1.009139    1.775392 
     lnFDIt-1 |   .8846312   .0908555    -1.19   0.233      .723336    1.081893 
       d_COL |   5.772276   2.516516     4.02   0.000     2.456135    13.56569 
        P2t-1 |   .9966861   .0264699    -0.12   0.901     .9461332     1.04994 
      lnACt-2 |   1.238793   .2931163     0.91   0.365     .7790985    1.969724 
       lnat-1 |   3.714909    .504239     9.67   0.000     2.847156    4.847134 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    /lnsig2u |  -2.015583   1.722081                     -5.390799    1.359633 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |   .3650243   .3143006                      .0675154    1.973515 
         rho |   .0389244   .0644219                      .0013836    .5420965 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Note: White’s (heteroskedasticity-adjusted) robust errors 
 
The OR column shows the odds ratio of being 
selected as a partner country (i.e. the ratio 
between the probability of being selected and 
the probability of not being so) when one of 
the explanatory variables of the model 
increases one-unit, ceteris paribus36. Hence the 
highest odds ratio is associated to the variable 
of Spanish colonial past. The interpretation of 
this coefficient in the case of two-category 
dummy variables is relatively simple: for two 
developing countries with identical values in 
the set of explanatory variables, but with 
different post-colonial links, it shows the 
difference between their probabilities of being 
selected partners. According to the estimation, 
the odds ratio for a former colony is 5.8 times 
greater than for a country without this 
historical link, a result that stems from the fact  
that only 79 of the 273 observations of the 
colonial past included in the panel data set (20 
                                                 
36 Formally, when variable xi increases one-unit, ceteris paribus, 
the odds ratio is multiplied by a factor equal to exi. 
ex-colonies analyzed along 13 years37) did not 
–significantly– participate in the Spanish 
AOD38. 
 
The aid’s path dependence also exerts an 
outstanding effect, imprinting a certain 
character of “persistence” in the selection 
process, in such a way that a one-percentage 
increase in the Spanish ODA-quota allocated 
the previous year to a developing country 
multiplies by 3.7 its odds of being re-selected 
as a partner. This path dependence of the 
Spanish aid is strongly linked to the special 
inclination towards the ex-colonial countries, 
which is further reinforced by the strong 
                                                 
37 Cuba is not included in the analysis due to the lack of 
information. 
38 Particularly: Argentina (1999–2001), Colombia (1993), Costa 
Rica (1992–95, 1998, 2001, 2004 and 2005), Cuba (1992–94), 
Chile (1997–2005), Dominican Republic (1992–94), El Salvador 
(1992–94), Equatorial Guinea (2003), Guatemala (1992–94), 
Honduras (1992), Mexico (1996, 1997, 1999–2001, 2003 and 
2004), Nicaragua (1992), Panama (1992–95 and 2002–05), 
Paraguay (1992–94, 1996, 2000, 2002, 2004 and 2005), Peru 
(1992–94), Philippines (1992 and 1996), Uruguay (1996–2002 
and 2004) and Venezuela (1992–95, 1998, 2004 and 2005). 
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specialization of the Spanish NGOs’ in Latin 
America, Equatorial Guinea and North Africa. 
The other two statistically significant variables 
have a less decisive influence in the selection 
process: on the one hand, a one-percent 
increase in the share of Spanish exports 
increases the odds of selection by 34%, which, 
to a great extent, reflects the convergence of 
trade and aid interests. On the other hand, a 
one-percent increment in the share of global 
aid increases the odds of selection by almost 
41%. This result confirms that Spain has been 
influenced by a “bandwagon effect”, which 
suggests three –not necessarily exclusive– 
possible explanations: either Spain perceives 
that ODA is more effective in those countries 
that receive more resources from the rest of 
the donors; or that the donors’ international 
community –including Spain– agrees when 
assisting the “neediest” countries, thus 
selecting a fairly similar group of partners; or, 
finally, that the regions where donors share 
strong geo-strategic interests (mainly, the 
Middle East and the largest developing 
countries) are, in turn, regions of interest for 
Spain; such is the case of countries like Israel 
(which received ODA until 1996, being one of 
the world’s main aid recipients), Egypt, China, 
India and Indonesia, which –except for India– 
have been aid partners during the 13 years 
analysed39. In the end, a positive coefficient of 
this variable reflects a lack of coordination 
with the rest of international donors in the 
definition of their “intervention areas”, which 
may reinforce the existence of “aid darling and 
“orphan countries”, or a excessive 
fragmentation of the Spanish interventions due 
to the attempts to catch up with the interests 
of the international community, even at the 
expense of over-scattering the resources. 
Regarding the goodness-of-fit of the model, the  
χ2 test of overall significance rejects the 
hypothesis that all the variables exert a 
simultaneously null effect in the selection (see 
p-value in Table 2). Moreover, the model 
correctly classifies 91.8% of the cases, 
offering a reasonable fit that allows us to trust 
the accuracy of the estimates40. 
There is, however, a certain number of 
observations that deviate from the historical 
                                                 
39 Since this estimation-stage only analyses whether a developing 
country is chosen or not as aid-partner, it does not consider the 
amount of resources finally disbursed. 
40 Results available upon request. 
criteria. According to the value of the Cook’s 
dD distance statistic (which measures to 
what extent an individual observation affects 
the model’s estimation, identifying the 
outliers), only 4 observations may exert 
considerable influence (with dD statistics 
greater than 7)41: the selection of Kazakstan 
(KAZ) in 2001, since its share of the global aid 
decreased to less than half the percentage of 
2000, and its share of Spanish exports 
increased more than 64% coinciding with the 
boom of the energy sector; Pakistan (PAK), 
which was selected as an aid partner for the 
first time in 1995, despite the 52% reduction 
of its share of the global aid (remaining 
constant its share of Spanish exports); Serbia 
and Montenegro (YGU), which participated 
for the first time in Spain’s aid in 1999 (the 
same year of the NATO’s bombing and the 
eventual withdrawal of Serbian military forces 
from Kosovo); and Zimbabwe (ZWE), which 
only in 1998 received more than 1% of the 
Spanish resources, just before its involvement 
in the war in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo between 1998 and 2002, which drained 
hundreds of millions of dollars from the 
economy (including ODA)42. All in all, it 
should be noticed that all these outliers are not 
Spanish ex-colonies43. 
5.2. Allocation of aid-quotas 
among partner countries 
The analysis of the second-step allocation 
decision distinguishes between two groups of 
partner countries: those that have post-
colonial links with Spain, and those without 
this historical legacy44. These two groups 
received, respectively, 57.8% and 42.2% of the 
accumulated aid resources during 1993–2005, 
despite their unequal participation in the 
sample, both in terms of the number of 
countries (20 and 84 countries, respectively, in 
                                                 
41 Since the binary variable of colonial past does not vary over 
time, the prediction errors stem from the time changes in the 
rest of the explanatory variables, mainly in the previous year 
Spanish aid-quota (which is the variable that exerts a greater 
influence in the selection process, after the colonial past). 
42 In 1998, the Spanish aid to Zimbabwe was especially high due 
to the financing of two NGO projects that amounted for 504.779 
euros (i.e. 78% of the aid). 
43 However, these 4 especially influential outliers do not 
significantly affect the estimates (results available upon request). 
44 Spain’s ex-colonial countries are: Argentina, Bolivia, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Chile, Dominican Rep., Ecuador, El 
Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Guatemala, Honduras, México, 
Morocco, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, 
Uruguay and Venezuela. 
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the panel data set of the first-step estimation), 
and population (which, consequently, implies 
a strong ODA per capita allocation bias in 
favour of the ex-colonies, which, on average, 
received 12.91 dollars per person, in contrast 
with the 0.95 dollars received by the second 
group of partners)45. 
Firstly, 25 countries without post-colonial 
links took part, for at least one year, in Spain’s 
ODA with quotas greater than 1%. 
                                                 
45 Calculations based on accumulated 1993–2005 aid gross 
disbursements –netted of emergency aid and debt relief. 
 The analysis reveals the lack of a systematic 
pattern of humanitarian aid allocation which 
has not been guided by the recipients’ needs 
and specially benefits those countries with 
higher levels of income per capita, although it 
has been sensitive to population sizes. Spanish 
trade interests have reinforced the aid 
allocation, unlike the investment interests, 
which have been inversely related to aid. 
Moreover, Spain has benefited those countries 
with higher aid dependency ratios (Table 3). 
 
 
Table 3. Estimation of the Spanish pattern of ODA geographical allocation. Countries without
post-colonial links. 1993–2005 
 
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =       117 
Group variable (i): n                           Number of groups   =        25 
R-sq:  within  = 0.1802                         Obs per group: min =         1 
       between = 0.5000                                        avg =       4.7 
       overall = 0.5417                                        max =        13 
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(8)       =     72.75 
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
         lna |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   lnGDPpct-2 |   .5626937   .1562729     3.60   0.000     .2564044    .8689829 
     lnPOBt-2 |   .2797479   .0836134     3.35   0.001     .1158687    .4436272 
      lnDRt-2 |   .0419105   .2226739     0.19   0.851    -.3945223    .4783433 
   lna_others|   .0548938     .10018     0.55   0.584    -.1414554     .251243 
     lnEXPt-1 |   .1549511   .0553858     2.80   0.005      .046397    .2635052 
     lnFDIt-1 |  -.3356915   .0741509    -4.53   0.000    -.4810246   -.1903583 
        P2t-1 |  -.0173776   .0113052    -1.54   0.124    -.0395354    .0047801 
      lnACt-2 |   .3900336    .115643     3.37   0.001     .1633775    .6166897 
       _cons |  -7.419358   2.126794    -3.49   0.000     -11.5878   -3.250919 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  .22739736 
     sigma_e |  .42330668 
         rho |   .2239497   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Note: White’s  (heteroskedasticity-adjusted) robust errors 
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In particular, a one-percentage increase in the 
recipient country’s per capita income –ceteris 
paribus– has been associated with a 0.56% 
increase in the ODA disbursements, which 
does not correspond with a progressive 
allocation criterion. By contrast, Spanish 
assistance has been sensitive to the partners’ 
different population sizes, although a one-
percentage increase in the receiving 
population has led to a less than proportional 
increase in the aid disbursement (0.28%).  
These last two results are due to, to a large 
extent, the distribution pattern with the highly 
populated countries: on the one hand, Spain 
has continuously co-operated with China 
(which has attracted a large share of the FAD 
loans), and, for several years, with Indonesia, 
Brazil, Pakistan, Vietnam, Egypt and Turkey 
(each of these countries had more than 75 
million inhabitants in 2005, and only two of 
them are not middle-income economies: 
Pakistan and Vietnam); on the other hand, the 
poorest and highly populated countries 
(especially India, Nigeria and Bangladesh) did 
not ever receive aid-quotas greater than 1% 
(thus, not being considered in this estimation 
stage). These facts explain the preference for 
the more populated partners and the regressive 
middle-income countries bias. 
The aid-exports elasticity has been positive 
(0.15%), thus supporting Spanish trade 
interests, which coincides with the previously 
remarked result of the partners’ selection 
process. At the same time, some of the main 
trade partners are middle-income and highly 
populated countries (particularly China, Brazil 
and Turkey) that offer especially attractive 
markets for Spanish products. 
Furthermore, a one-percentage increase in the 
stock of Spanish investment has led to a –
0.34% decrease in the aid-quota, and a similar 
increase in the partner country’s ODA/GNI 
ratio has increased it by 0.39%. These results 
reflect a special attention towards those highly 
aid-dependent developing economies that 
attract less investment. In some ways, the 
lower provision of financial resources (mainly, 
foreign direct investment) is being 
compensated by disbursing greater amounts of 
concessional resources. This has been the case 
of highly aid-dependent economies (with 
ODA/GNI ratios over 20% in several years) 
that have been aid partners of Spain, such as  
Mozambique, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Equatorial 
Guinea and, more recently, Mauritania,  
Senegal and Angola, which, besides, have 
attracted less Spanish investment than other 
developing economies46. All these countries 
are, on the other hand, prioritised in the 
current Aid Plan. 
Secondly, there is a significantly different 
pattern of aid allocation regarding the 20 
countries with post-colonial links with Spain, 
which corresponds to a more balanced strategy 
of altruist motivations and foreign policy 
interests (Table 4). The aid-quotas have been 
distributed in direct proportion to the partner 
countries’ needs (assessed by means of the per 
capita GDP and the population size), and have 
backed Spanish trade interests, being, by 
contrast, inversely related to the investment 
orientations. However, other variables related 
to the recipients’ absorptive capacity and level 
of democracy have not exerted a significant 
influence in the distribution. 
 
In particular, regarding the variables related to 
the recipients’ needs, the following results are 
worth remarking: on the one hand, a one-
percentage increase in the partner’s per capita 
income –if other variables stay the same– has 
been less than proportionally compensated by 
a –0.46% decrease in the aid-quota. This 
results shows certain sensitivity towards the 
recipients’ levels of economic development, 
although it does not characterize a strictly 
progressive allocation, since the per capita 
income coefficient is smaller than one. 
Furthermore, a one-percentage increase in the 
population size has led to a more than 
proportional (4%) increase in the aid-quota, 
which rules out the existence of a small 
country bias within the group of ex-colonies; 
on the contrary, countries with higher 
populations have tended to receive 
proportionally greater amounts of resources 
than the smaller ones –once the effects of the 
rest of the explanatory variables are controlled. 
 
Regarding the trade and investment interests, 
on the one hand, Spain has tended to 
concentrate its aid on its main trade partners 
(with the export coefficient equal to 0.34%). 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
46 However, Equatorial Guinea has gradually reduced its aid-
dependency ratio since the late 1990s. 
 24
  
Table 4. Estimation of the Spanish pattern of ODA geographical allocation. Countries with 
post-colonial links. 1993–2005 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       193 
Group variable (i): n                           Number of groups   =        20 
R-sq:  within  = 0.2677                         Obs per group: min =         4 
       between = 0.2727                                        avg =       9.7 
       overall = 0.1045                                        max =        13 
                                                F(8,165)           =      6.50 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.9962                        Prob > F           =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
       lna   |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   lnGDPpct-2 |  -.4640383   .1414169    -3.28   0.001    -.7432582   -.1848184 
     lnPOBt-2 |   4.021031   .9840364     4.09   0.000     2.078105    5.963958 
      lnDRt-2 |   .1085396   .9641113     0.11   0.911    -1.795046    2.012125 
   lna_others|  -.0354341   .0574121    -0.62   0.538    -.1487912     .077923 
     lnEXPt-1 |   .3359423    .082892     4.05   0.000     .1722765    .4996081 
     lnFDIt-1 |  -.2550163   .0555764    -4.59   0.000    -.3647489   -.1452836 
        P2t-1 |  -.0357236   .0306168    -1.17   0.245    -.0961749    .0247277 
      lnACt-2 |  -.0028646   .1268188    -0.02   0.982    -.2532614    .2475322 
       _cons |  -58.12898   16.52016    -3.52   0.001    -90.74714   -25.51082 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  4.8877226 
     sigma_e |  .41780618 
         rho |  .99274605   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Note: White’s (heteroskedasticity-adjusted) robust errors 
 
This result is due to, to a certain extent, the 
distribution criteria in proportion to the 
recipient’s population, since the largest 
countries offer broader markets for Spanish 
products. Moreover, it should be born in mind 
that Spanish exports are specially concentrated 
on the group of ex-colonies: these 21 
economies (among 126 countries included in 
the initial data set, i.e. without excluding those 
that lack the necessary information) absorbed, 
on average, 5.82% of the period’s aggregated 
exports, in contrast with the 9.36% of the 
remaining 105 countries. Consequently, given 
the high concentration of resources in this 
group of recipients –both in terms of aid and 
exports–, trade interests have exerted a greater 
influence among the former colonies than 
among the more heterogeneous group of non 
ex-colonial countries. On the other hand, a 
one-percentage increase in the stock of 
investment has led to a marginal decrease in 
the aid-quota (–0.25%), since the lower 
relative development of the ex-colonies that 
received higher shares of aid implies less  
 
opportunities for Spanish investors. In the 
end, both results show that trade and 
investment priorities have two different 
association patterns with aid –as also 
happened in the selection stage. 
Moreover, it should be pointed out that, 
although Spain’s selection of aid-partners has 
been affected by the “bandwagon effect” –as it 
was shown in the previous section–, this has 
not been the case in the process of allocating 
the aid-quotas. This is due to, on the one 
hand, the different “implications” of both 
decision-steps: the first stage deals with the 
partners selection, but does not measure the 
“intensity” of the eventually established co-
operation relations (i.e. the model captures the 
similarities between Spain’s and the rest of 
donors’ selections, without assessing the final 
disbursements). On the other hand, the 
separate estimation of the aid-quota stage 
between countries with historical links with 
Spain (most of them middle-income countries) 
and countries without these links hinders the 
geographical coincidences with the rest of the 
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donors. In fact, the partial correlation between 
the Spanish and the rest of donors aid 
allocations has been positive (0.23), although 
it has not been possible to estimate its effect 
on the full sample of partner countries due to 
the impossibility of including the colonial 
dummy variable in the fixed-effects panel data 
model. When the group of ex-colonial 
countries is separately analysed (as in Table 
4), Spanish aid disbursements appear to have 
been negatively correlated with those of the 
rest of donors, although its effect has been 
economically and statistically non significant. 
In any event, the aid bias towards middle-
income countries –consequence of the 
specialization in the ex-colonies, with only 
Equatorial Guinea classified as a non middle-
income economy– cannot be interpreted as an 
effort to coordinate the Spanish interventions 
with the rest of the donors, but it may rather 
respond to the interest of both compensating 
these countries for their lower participation in 
the global aid (especially Latin Americans), 
and taking advantage of the cultural affinities –
affinities that, on the other hand, this group of 
countries does not share with any other donor. 
With respect to the model’s goodness-of-fit, 
the overall F test is flatly rejected in both 
estimation groups (vid p-values = 0,0000 in the 
upper-left corners of Tables 3 and 4). Also, 
both estimations offer reasonable adjustments, 
although there is a certain number of outliers 
that should be carefully analysed47: 
With regard to the countries without Spanish 
post-colonial links, 5 countries have outliers 
that may especially influence the estimation 
(with residuals greater than |0.8|): in first 
place, China (CHN) in 1993 and 1994, which 
received 15.8% and 20.4% of the Spanish 
ODA, respectively, whereas the model predicts 
quotas of less than 2%. These discrepancies 
owed to the 140.1 and 153.12 million dollars 
of FAD loans granted in these two years (that 
amounted to 99.12% and 99.18% of the 
Spanish aid disbursed to China, respectively). 
Nevertheless, one year later (1995), Spain’s 
ODA decreased almost to a third of its 
previous-year value, so that the gross 
disbursements have been, up to 2005, around 
50 million dollars per year (which represents 
between 4.6% and 8.9% of the donor’s aid). 
                                                 
47 See Tezanos (2007, pp. 35-38) for further explanations on the 
outliers. 
In second place, Indonesia (IDN), in 2000, 
received 10.14% of the Spanish aid, in contrast 
to the 1.25% predicted quota, thus increasing 
4.8 times its 1999 share due to the grant of a 
65.87 million FAD loan, which amounted to 
99.7% of the received aid. Nevertheless, three 
years later (2003), Spain had to condone 6.52 
millions of this debt. 
In third place, in 1999, Serbia and Montenegro 
(YGU) received an aid-quota 12 times greater 
than the predicted one. In this case, most of 
the resources were grants aimed at promoting 
the peacemaking process of the Balkans. 
In fourth place, Turkey (TUR) received in 
2003 and 2004 much greater quotas than the 
predicted ones, due to the grant of 40.32 and 
48.1 million dollar FAD loans, respectively, 
that almost tripled their receptions of Spanish 
aid in 2002. 
In fifth place, Vietnam (VNM) received in 
2001 an aid-quota 20% smaller than the 
predicted one. This country has only taken 
part in the Spanish aid for two years with 
quotas greater than 1%: in 1998, due to the 
grant of a 10.79 million FAD loan (99.4% of 
the donor’s aid disbursed to Vietnam), and in 
2001, with another loan of 5.38 million 
(76.5% of the ODA). 
All in all, the characteristics of these outliers 
point to three conclusions: firstly, there is an 
obvious divergence of geographical priorities 
between the concessional loan scheme 
(independently managed by the Ministry of 
Industry, Tourism and Trade) and the rest of 
the Spanish bilateral ODA. Secondly, most of 
the outliers are cases of “over-allocation” (in 
comparison with the historical pattern 
identified by the model), which indicates that 
these observations are causing an “over-
prediction” of the parameters showed in Table 
3; this way, the allocation bias that favours 
those countries with relatively higher income 
levels and population sizes is reinforced by the 
presence of outliers among middle-income and 
highly populated countries, such as China, 
Indonesia and Turkey. Finally, it stands out 
that, in spite of the erratic –in terms of 
developmental criteria, but not in terms of the 
donor’s economic interests– allocation pattern 
detected with this group of partners, the 
current Aid Plan includes all of them in some 
of the three levels of Spain’s aid geographical 
priorities. 
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Regarding the countries with post-colonial 
links, 5 observations have a special influence 
in the estimation (with residuals greater than 
|0.8 |): firstly, Mexico (MEX), which received 
24.4% of the Spanish ODA in 1993, and 19.6% 
in 1994, well above the predicted quotas due 
to the FAD loans granted gradually since 1992 
(which amounted to 162.65, 216.69 and 
144.65 million dollars in 1992, 1993 and 
1994, respectively). Although in the 10 
following years Mexico has received additional 
loans for 14.33 million dollars, the magnitudes 
disbursed at the beginning of the 1990s 
explain its position as a “long-term debtor” of 
the Spanish assistance, as well as the existence 
of another atypical observation in 2005, in this 
case due to an aid “infra-allocation” (8.7 times 
smaller than the predicted one). 
Secondly, Venezuela (VEN) in 2000 received 
an aid-quota greater than the predicted one, 
again due to the grant of a FAD loan that 
amounted to 21.39 million dollars (77.1% of 
the Spanish aid disbursed to this country). 
Other outliers of smaller influence in the 
analysis belong to Argentina (ARG, 2002 for 
the revitalization of ODA disbursements 
experienced during the economic crisis), 
Bolivia (BOL, 1997 and 1999, for the decrease 
in aid disbursements that especially affected 
the FAD loans), El Salvador (SLV, 2002, due 
to the grant of 31.54 million dollars of FAD 
loans, 57% of their aid that year) and Morocco 
(MAR, 2004, which tripled the 2003 quota, 
mainly due to the disbursement of further 
grants). 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
The geographical allocation of Spanish aid has 
been little studied by the specialized literature, 
despite the fact that it is unusually 
concentrated on middle-income countries. The 
present analysis contributes additional elements 
to understand this peculiar middle-income 
specialization, offering statistical evidence which 
points out that the geographical orientation of the 
ODA has not been specially determined by 
“altruistic” criteria –i.e. development promotion 
and poverty reduction, as the Spanish 
International Co-operation Law advocates–, but 
neither by merely “self-interest” criteria –the 
promotion of Spain’s foreign policy 
conveniences–. Consequently, the resource 
allocation has followed a “hybrid” pattern, 
although it does not seem to have considered 
those aspects related to the partners’ levels of 
democracy and absorptive capacities. In 
particular, the allocation among the group of 
countries without post-colonial links with Spain 
reveals that, until a recent period, the Spanish co-
operation system lacked a clear selectivity –pro-
developmental– strategy. In contrast, regarding 
the group of countries with post-colonial links, 
Spain has had a more progressive and balanced 
pattern of allocation in comparison with the 
previous group of partners. 
 
The identification of a hybrid pattern in the 
case of the Spanish aid allocation coincides 
with the results obtained by previous studies 
(Alonso, 1999; Sánchez Alcázar, 1999; 
Berthèlemy and Tichit, 2002; Alesina and 
Weder, 2002; and Isopi and Mavrotas, 2006), 
which estimated different weights of the RN 
and DI factors, but agreed by pointing out the 
importance of the foreign policy interests and 
the insufficient attention paid to issues related 
to the recipient Governments’ governance. 
 
All in all, the concurrence of self foreign policy 
interests and developmental motivations 
identified in the Spanish aid geographical 
specialization does not have to infringe the 
main goal of supporting the progress of 
developing countries, but, rather, the synergies 
of these different motivations should be 
channelled so that they redound in a full 
conception of “partnership” between 
recipients and donor. Nevertheless, given the 
strong specialization in those countries with 
greater cultural affinities with Spain, the 
geographical priorities should be defined in a 
clearer and more selective way, explicitly 
including considerations about the capacity of 
effectively using the resources –both on the 
part of the recipients, and on the part of the 
donor–, as well as the existence of sound 
governance policies and institutions in the 
partner countries. 
 
The insufficient progressiveness of the Spanish 
allocation is mainly driven by the influence of 
the post-colonial links; links that are, in a 
certain way, “revitalized” and “re-updated” by 
means of the international assistance. 
Nevertheless, post-colonial links have 
characterized the allocation patterns of all 
donor countries that were colonial 
metropolises. The peculiarity of the Spanish 
case is that the countries that were part of its 
Empire have, precisely, higher income levels 
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than the former colonies of other European 
donors. This fact brings about the apparent 
regressive bias of the allocation, and blurs 
Spain’s commitment with the MDG and the 
special attention to the poorest countries. 
These historical links –which not only affect 
aid policies, but influence the entire Spanish 
foreign policy– have acquired a structural 
character for the partner economies, and 
represent a long-run political commitment of 
the Spanish State, thus stamping certain 
“persistence” on the aid geographical 
priorities. 
 
Nevertheless, these links have to be updated in 
order to develop “dynamic” co-operation 
partnerships, which should evolve as the 
relative necessities of the recipient countries 
change. Spain’s aid policy towards its ex-
colonies have positively advanced in recent 
years, more clearly defining its geographical 
strategy and committing itself to concentrate 
the resources on the list of “high-priority” 
partners, which has been recently expanded to 
more relatively needed countries, thus shaping 
a process of –necessarily gradual– adaptation 
of its international specialization. Moreover, 
Spain has improved its co-operation strategy 
with middle-income countries, advocating for 
a greater specialization of the interventions, 
according to the levels of development of the 
partners. 
Regarding the most heterogeneous group of 
developing countries without historical links 
to Spain, the developmentally undefined aid 
allocation strategy is due to –to a large extent– 
the excessive fragmentation of the resources 
and the divergent geographical interests of the 
concessional FAD loan scheme. However, 
Spain has recently added some of these 
countries to its regional priorities, integrating 
them in the resource’s planning and evaluation 
cycle. Although this has implied an increase in 
the number of prioritized countries –which, in 
the end, determines the level of dispersion–, 
this process can contribute to strengthen the 
effectiveness and reduce the excessive aid 
fragmentation, as long as the bulk of the 
resources is reallocated to the 54 economies 
prioritized by the Aid Plan, and where Spain’s 
co-operation has better chances of optimizing 
its resources in terms of developmental 
outcomes. Furthermore, the policies carried 
out in the broad group of partners receiving 
marginal aid-quotas needs to be more 
selective, specific and clearly oriented towards 
contributing to overcome their peculiar 
situations of vulnerability. 
 
Regarding the FAD loans, although their 
participation in Spanish aid has been 
considerably reduced, it is still necessary to 
integrate their geographic priorities within the 
whole co-operation strategy, which in turn 
implies a greater co-ordination between the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and C-operation –
genuine co-ordinator of the Spanish aid– and 
the Ministry of Industry, Trade and Tourism –
responsible for the loan scheme. 
 
However, this aid specialization pattern 
towards ex-colonial countries –and 
consequently towards middle-income 
economies– cannot be interpreted as an effort 
to coordinate the Spanish interventions with 
the rest of the donors. It may rather respond to 
the interest of both compensating these 
countries for their lower participation in the 
global aid (especially Latin Americans), and 
taking advantage of the cultural affinities –
affinities that, on the other hand, this group of 
countries does not share with any other 
donor–. However, the definition of a more 
effective strategy of Spanish ODA geographical 
specialization will also require a greater co-
ordination among the donors’ international 
community, which should aim to avoid the 
existence of “aid darling and orphan 
countries”, as well as taking advantage of the 
synergies of the different donors’ 
interventions, allowing less fragmentation of 
the Spanish resources and greater effectiveness 
of the interventions. Therefore, some kind of 
aid specialization is advisable, and, within this 
context, Spain will need to improve its 
developmental strategy in order to contribute 
to build a cooperation system which is 
incentive-compatible with the development 
aims, specializing its support on those 
countries that are close to the “border” of the 
developed world. 
 
Finally, the integrated RN–DI model for the 
Spanish ODA proposed in this paper 
contributes some methodological advantages. 
Firstly, it develops an allocation model 
adapted to the political and management 
peculiarities of the Spanish official co-
operation system, thus offering more precise 
interpretations than “standardized” models. 
Secondly, it uses a wide panel data set that 
covers the last 13 years of Spanish assistance 
to 104 developing economies. Thirdly, it 
appropriately considers the censored nature of 
the dependent variable, both analysing the 
decision of selecting aid partners, and the 
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decision of allocating aid-quotas. Fourthly, it 
uses a coherent set of explanatory variables 
that captures the especial relations maintained 
with the former colonies, the inertia of the 
allocations, and the information lags faced by 
the aid policy-makers. However, a few words of 
caution are worth mentioning since there is a 
series of inherent limitations to the study of the 
geographical aid allocation: 
On the one hand, in spite of the increasing 
sophistication of the econometric procedures 
available for the analysis, it is complicated to 
control the different factors of heterogeneity 
existing among the aid receiving countries; 
heterogeneity that is not only captured by the 
variables included in the model, but is also 
present in the different capacities of the recipients 
economies to efficiently take advantage of 
external resources, the existence of difficult aid 
partnership relations between donor and 
recipients, as well as other qualitative variables of 
difficult quantification –such as ethical and 
institutional factors, political affinities, the 
existence of immigrant lobbies in the donor 
country, etc.–. Furthermore, it should be born in 
mind that the eventual allocation of aid is 
contingent on its fungible character, which 
hinders, in some circumstances, the assurance 
that the resources disbursed to the neediest 
countries finally benefit their poorest citizens48. 
Moreover, it would be necessary to consider, in 
the particular case of Spain, that the recent 
escalation of the immigration flows may 
constitute a decisive variable in the evolution of 
the pattern of aid giving, which may be affected 
by the arrival of immigrants of nationalities 
different from those historically linked with 
Spain49. 
On the other hand, this paper contributes an 
analytical model of the geographical aid 
specialization that allows the identification of the 
particular –current– orientations of the official 
Spanish co-operation and assesses them with 
respect to the –by law– aid strategy and the 
international commitments and consensus ratified 
by Spain. However, although the model identifies 
different types of determinants that capture the 
                                                 
48 See the studies on aid fungibility of Feyzioglu et al. (1998), 
Devarajan and Swaroop (1998) and Pack and Pack (2003). 
49 Lahiri and Raimondos-M∅ller (2000) developed and aid 
allocation model focusing on the influence exerted by the 
different immigrant nationalities present in the donor country. 
Nevertheless, in the case of Spain, the information that 
facilitates the State Secretary of Immigration and Emigration 
does not offer complete time series data on the immigrants’ 
countries of origin, which is limited to the most recent years. 
heterogeneous interests that are present in the 
allocation, it does not control other “qualitative” 
aspects of aid, such as its composition –grants and 
loans; tied status; etc.–, its sectorial distribution, 
the use of appropriate aid instruments, the 
efficiency levels of the different interventions, the 
donor’s self-capacity to usefully administrate the 
disbursed resources, etc. 
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